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Abstract

The bipolar view of unsustainable intermediate exchange rate regimes transitioning into the corners of hard
pegs and free floats has attracted much attention and criticism in recent times. While highly mobile capital is
argued to render intermediate regimes unsustainable by the virtues of the impossible trinity (Fischer 2001),
the prevalent “fear of floating” can eliminate the flexible pole of the bipolar view for developing countries
(Calvo and Reinhart 2000). This paper employs four-way, de jure and de facto exchange rate classifications to
compare the performance of hard pegged exchange rate regimes – currency boards in particular – against that
of soft (adjustable) pegs, hard (heavy intervention) floats, and free floats. The conclusion from the analysis is
that hard pegs offer exceptional inflation performance even when accounting for possible endogeneity of
regime choice. Furthermore, hard pegged regimes stand out as the least crisis prone, while maintaining steady
growth comparable to that of free floats.
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I. Introduction
The long lasting debate on exchange rate regimes has taken a new turn in recent economic literature with regimes moving away
from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable fixed exchange rates towards the two poles: flexible exchange rates and fixed
exchange rates. In general, the tradeoff in moving from a floating exchange rate to a pegged rate manifests in reduced exchange
rate volatility at the cost of an independent monetary policy. Pegged regimes provide superior insulation of output against
monetary shocks and are deemed to reduce both exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs; thus, greater trade and
investment results (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002). In contrast, floating regimes efficiently absorb real shocks and enable
countries to retain an independent monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. The impossible trinity of a fixed
exchange rate, capital mobility, and an independent domestic monetary policy presents a strong case against traditional pegged
regimes. Support for such a regime will not be viable in the long run unless the regime is really hard1 and supported by a
credible commitment, since domestic monetary policy would undoubtedly be tempted to address exchange rate volatilities. One
primary attraction of pegged regimes, the removal of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism, is also their
principal drawback, since adjustment to domestic or international shocks is slower via differential domestic inflation than that
via the nominal exchange rate (Ghosh, Gulde Wolf 2002).
Currency board arrangements have gained increased popularity in recent years attributable to their success in
addressing objectives such as facilitating the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, arresting hyperinflation,
restoring exchange rate stability after a period of political and economic turmoil, and providing a trustworthy and stable
institutional framework. A currency board can allow a developing economy to establish its domestic currency relatively
promptly and efficiently by fixing the exchange rate between the domestic currency and the reserve currency at a
predetermined level and by guaranteeing that the domestic currency is backed by sufficient foreign exchange reserves. Though
currency boards are generally associated with outstanding inflation and interest rate performance, they are hardly a panacea.
The arrangement of this most extreme form of exchange rate peg imposes restrictions on the central bank’s ability to employ
monetary policy, diminishes its role as a lender of last resort and inhibits the creation of domestic credit. The stringent
institutional arrangements required to initiate a currency board aim to make its abolition a daunting task. These limitations, on
the other hand, tend to heighten confidence in the domestic monetary authority and financial institutions due to enhanced
monetary discipline and restrictive fiscal policy (Gulde, Kahkonen, Keller, 2000).

1

Hard pegged regimes denote currency board arrangements, dollarization and monetary unions.
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Thesis
This paper builds upon the study by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) by examining the inflation and output performance of
currency boards and other hard pegged regimes (such as dollarization and monetary unions) as well as of soft pegged and
floating regimes. The impossible trinity suggests that in countries with open capital accounts, traditional soft pegs have proved
to be unsustainable in the long run and crisis prone (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). The choice between a hard peg and a floating
rate depends on numerous factors including the unique characteristics of an economy: level of income, degree of openness of
capital accounts, and the country’s inflationary and monetary policy history. The choice of a hard peg is justifiable for
countries with a history of monetary instability and countries whose capital and current account transactions are closely
integrated with a group of other economies (Fischer 2001). Also, countries implementing hard pegged regimes are usually
small both in terms of GDP and population and are highly open to trade.
This paper seeks to employ regression analysis to empirically estimate the crisis proneness and the differences for the
levels of inflation and per capita GDP growth among countries with floating exchange rates, those with pegged exchange rates,
and finally, those with currency board arrangements or dollarization. Specifically, we expect the inflation levels for countries
implementing currency boards to be significantly lower than those for countries having pegged, intermediate floating and
floating exchange rates. Although we do not anticipate hard pegged regimes to exhibit exceptional output growth, we
conjecture that the superior inflation performance of the regime is not gained in a tradeoff between inflation and growth. The
assumed inflation performance advantage of hard pegged regimes inevitably raises the question of endogeneity of regime
choice since countries with a low propensity of inflation are prone to adopt relatively restrictive monetary regimes. Since in
real economies we often observe that monetary instability or hyperinflation predates arrangements of currency boards, we
anticipate the reverse causality bias to be unsubstantiated. Finally, with an eye towards improved stability, we expect to find
support for the bipolar view that countries will eventually abandon the crisis prone adjustable pegs and intermediate floats for
the corner solutions of free floats and hard pegs.

II. Literature Review
The theoretical literature on the choice and consequences of exchange rate regime adoption is expansive and ever-growing.
Essentially, the choice between adopting pegged or floating regimes represents a tradeoff between restricted exchange rate
volatility and the benefit of monetary policy as a stabilization tool. Following Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, one can claim, at the
risk of oversimplification, that the influential theoretical literature on the objectives of exchange rate regimes can be divided
into three broad categories: insulating the domestic economy, integrating economically with one or more countries, and
maintaining policy credibility towards macroeconomic goals.
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Studies by Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) on the insulating properties of exchange rate regimes with highly
mobile capital, focus on the prominent differences in the conduct of stabilization policy between pegged and floating regimes.
Interpreting monetary and fiscal policies as nominal and real shocks, respectively, fixed exchange rates provide greater
insulation of output in the face of nominal shocks, while floating exchange rates excel at absorbing real shocks (Ghosh, Gulde
and Wolf 23). Under a pegged regime, a monetary expansion lowers interest rates, which leads to capital outflows, reduced
reserves and money stock contraction. In this case monetary policy is rendered completely ineffective if perfect capital
mobility is assumed. On the other hand, under a floating regime, the capital outflows lead to depreciation of the exchange rate
which, subsequently, stimulates output. Fiscal expansions under a floating regime raise interest rates, which lead to capital
inflows, an appreciated exchange rate and a weakened trade balance. Under perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy is rendered
completely ineffective. In contrast, under a pegged regime, the capital inflow will force automatic monetary expansion
augmenting the effect of the fiscal expansions because of the central bank’s commitment to uphold the peg. These
considerations reinforce the impossible trinity of independent monetary policy, open capital accounts and fixed exchange rate.
Implementation of an exchange rate peg translates to abandoning the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment tool
which can adversely affect the potency of stabilization policy if alternative adjustment mechanisms such as wage and price
flexibility and factor mobility are unavailable. It is widely recognized that reduced exchange rate variability lowers uncertainty
and risk premiums, and thereby encourages cross border trade and trade integration which, in turn, may reduce the correlation
of shocks in the given region. While increased trade integration leads to superior specialization and diminishes the correlation
of supply shocks, it also facilitates the transition of demand shocks, which renders the net effect of increased trade on business
cycle correlations ambiguous.
The third major exchange literature strand is pioneered by the Barro and Gordon (1983) theoretical framework, which
emphasizes how credibility affects central banks’ decision-making in setting monetary policy. Exchange rate regimes can
theoretically be proposed as a potential nominal anchor aimed at lowering inflation expectations and, thus, at aiding the central
bank in the difficult task of lowering not only inflation but unemployment. Central banks face the credibility problem
associated with the incentive of generating surprise inflation in order to arrest unemployment. With wages being set before
monetary policy is altered, the workers can successfully factor such incentives into wage demands inducing unchanged
unemployment and increased inflation. In a closed economy such forward looking wage-setting can be rectified by conducting
extremely restrictive monetary policy in order to regain credibility. For open economies a stringent peg regime such as a
currency board can provide a strong pre-commitment and subsequent credibility boost given that the abolition of the pegged
regime comes at a significant political cost.
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Exchange rate regimes are theoretically constrained by the monetary policy trinity, which represent stark tradeoffs
among the three goals of policymakers in open economies: (1) exchange rate stability, (2) monetary policy autonomy, and (3)
freedom of capital movement (Refer to figure 6). Unfortunately since only two of these beneficial objectives can mutually
coexist, policymakers are forced to choose which one they wish to give up. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) claim that
if domestic monetary authority activism (2) means the ability to influence interest rates away from the world rate, then
arbitrage in open capital markets (3) and interest parity under a credibly fixed exchange rate (1) markedly defeat the purpose.
Using a measure of monetary independence based on short-term market interest rates, the authors estimate whether exchange
rate regimes influence the extent to which local interest rates diverge from the world rate. They find compelling historical
evidence in favor of the trinity, which, thus, emerges as a relevant and long enduring policy constraint. Furthermore, while
some countries adopt flexible or fixed exchange rates with respect to monetary independence preferences, “others have endured
crises and confusion in vacillating between these two corner solutions” (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 4).
In the past decade, pegged exchange rates, especially adjustable pegs, have emerged as culprits in the major financial
crises from the European exchange rate mechanism turmoil of 1992-93 to the crises in Mexico (1994); Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea (1997); Russia and Brazil (1998); Ecuador (1999); Argentina and Turkey (2000); and Turkey again (2001). The
severity of the ensuing crises, many of which turned into banking system and economic activity collapses, have rendered many
policymakers wary of exchange rate regimes between the corner solutions of hard pegs and free floats. Apart from the
impossible trinity, intermediate regimes are affected by political incentives to tamper with the exchange rate whenever the
short-term benefits outweigh the costs. Policymaker’s concerns with nominal and real exchange rates are fueled by their effects
on inflation, and allocation of resources and wealth of domestic citizens, respectively (Fischer 2001). Furthermore, emerging
market economies are averse to both substantial exchange rate appreciation and depreciation due to loss of export
competitiveness, and pervasive government and private sector foreign denominated debt, respectively (Reinhart 2000). On the
other hand, the increased capital mobility, due to the lifting of capital controls and improved communications technology, has
made pegs extremely vulnerable to speculation and thus unsustainable in the long run without an irrevocable official
commitment to upholding the peg. The “fear of floating,” prevalent both today and in the past, coupled with the
aforementioned policymaker credibility concerns, gives the upper hand to hard pegged regimes which simultaneously tackle
both issues (Reinhart 2000). Both Fischer (2001), and Bubula and Otker-Robe (2004) employ a de facto exchange rate regime
classification and find that while the proportion of IMF members with intermediate exchange rates fell during the 1990’s, the
proportion using hard pegs and free floats rose markedly, corroborating the bipolar view (Refer to figures 1 and 2).
The bipolar theory, however, has been contested on a number of grounds such as Argentina’s currency board collapse,
“fear of floating,” differences in exchange rate regime classification, and lack of solid empirical evidence (Bubula and Otker-
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Robe 2004). Many theorists have pledged support to Frankel’s claim that “no single currency regime is right for all countries at
all times” (Frankel 1999). Fischer, a key proponent, admits that the bipolar view may have been exaggerated for “dramatic
effect,” but insists that while a variety of flexible arrangements exist, adjustable pegs are unsustainable in the long run since
exchange rate movements profoundly influence most countries’ policy (Fisher 2001). Rogoff and others (2003) employ a new
classification of exchange rate regimes and find that the bipolar view is an inaccurate historical description and an unlikely
scenario for the future. The authors attribute these innovative results to the specifics of the natural2 classification, which differs
substantially from the IMF’s de jure and de facto classifications and reveals no “hollowing out of the middle” (Refer to figure
5) They argue that intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability by taking account of the tendency of countries to
allow less flexibility in practice than in policy, or the “fear of floating” theory by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Countries’
reluctance to permit unfettered fluctuation of their exchange rates can be attributed to policy credibility concerns, loss of trade
competitiveness due to large potential appreciation, inflationary pressures and currency mismatches of foreign currency
denominated liabilities. Furthermore, the authors argue that as an economy matures, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises
notably, and flexible exchange rate regimes offer developed countries high growth performance without any loss in credibility
(Reinhart 2000). They, however, acknowledge that rigid exchange rate regimes are relatively impervious to speculative attacks
and offer anti-inflationary credibility gain without compromising growth or volatility.
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2004) evaluate the bipolar view and the potential for crisis proneness of exchange rate
regimes on a large sample of countries in the 90’s using the IMF’s de facto classification. Similar to Fischer (2001), the authors
claim that the number of hard pegged and floating regimes have increased substantially while the number of intermediate
regimes has declined (Refer to Figure 2). They find that the frequency of crises associated with pegged regimes is greater than
under floating regimes for all countries, but about the same for developing countries with relatively closed capital markets.
Intermediate regimes emerge, however, as considerably more crisis prone compared to the polar alternatives across country
groups. Hard pegs consistently exhibit the lowest crisis incidence rate, which is about a third of intermediate regimes’ rate.
Furthermore, the authors provide evidence that their results are not driven by an endogeneity bias, namely that a move to an
intermediate regime signals an imminent crisis. In general, the study presents broad support for the bipolar view and
demonstrates the flight from the more susceptible to crises intermediate regimes but warns that there is no substantial evidence
of their future disappearance.
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) estimate that countries under pegged exchange rate regimes average 10.5 percentage
points lower inflation rates than those with floating exchange rates over the period from 1970 to 1999. While they attribute
slightly less than half of the differential to greater regime confidence engendered by adoption of a pegged regime, the major
2

Refer to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Rogoff and others (2003).
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portion of the rest represents consequent monetary and fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the authors determine that heightened
credibility of the domestic financial institutions encourages money holding and thus results in lower inflation for given money
growth. Using a six part classification of exchange rate regimes, the authors report that hard pegged regimes offer significantly
better performance than either soft pegged or intermediate regimes. The study finds negligible endogeneity effects of current
inflation performance on regime choice by employing a two stage probit procedure. Furthermore, since money growth is an
independent variable in the inflation regression specification, the indirect effects of pegged exchange rate regimes are not
accounted for. Thus, controlling for pegged exchange rate regimes’ indirect effect on inflation operating through circumscribed
money growth, the study estimates a notably higher coefficient for the pegged exchange rate regime variable. This clearly
shows that exchange rate regimes have a significantly stronger effect on inflation when one accounts for the money policy
conducted under pegged regimes.
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf also consider the effects of exchange rate regime choice on output growth and find that both
pegged and intermediate regimes are associated with better growth performance than floats. “The differences in growth
performance [of pegged regimes] are neither paltry nor spectacular” with respect to floating rates regimes since results are
found to be insignificant for pegged regimes and not robust across sub-samples (Ghosh, Gulde, Wolf, 93). Similar to the
inflation regression, the authors estimate the indirect effect on output of exchange rate regime choice through trade openness
and investment but fail to find substantiated evidence of endogeneity. Disaggregation of the exchange rate regime classification
into a more detailed one suggests that the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and output performance is not linear.
Hard pegged regimes fare no worse than pure floats, and basket pegs coupled with hard floats emerge as the best performers.
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf note that their findings, consistent with the theoretical literature, fail to identify a significant
relationship between exchange rate regimes and real output growth. Overall, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf find compelling
evidence that pegged regimes offer superior inflation and competitive real output growth performances compared with floating
regimes.

III. Exchange Rate Regime Classification
Intuitively, one could lump exchange rate regimes into two main categories: fixed and floating. A pegged exchange rate
operates similarl to an exchange rate anchored to another currency or commodity. Further, unlike a floating rate, a peg signifies
a formal commitment by the central bank to subject its monetary policy to meeting the exchange rate’s targets and to
maintaining parity through specified foreign exchange interventions. In reality, however, a plethora of arrangements in terms of
peg rigidity exist (See Table 1), and “no single currency regime is right for all countries at all times” (Frankel 1999).
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Since every IMF member country’s central bank is required to submit a formal yearly statement of its intentions on
exchange rate policy a de jure classification of exchange rate regimes can be plausibly formed. De jure classifications strongly
support the bipolar view (Refer to figure 4). In general, a formal announcement of future exchange rate regime change reflects
the policy of the domestic monetary authority and is bound to affect the economy and popular expectations in a most profound
way. Though such an approach is forward looking and emphasizes the importance of pronounced policy signals, the de jure
classification has a crucial drawback: intentions do not necessarily coincide with actions. Some countries with declared fixed
exchange rates do not take sufficient action to defend their pegs and devalue frequently. Others abuse the pegged exchange rate
regime’s credibility and implement markedly expansionary policy. Additionally, countries under a floating exchange rate often
administer substantial interventions in the foreign exchange market in order to keep the exchange rate within a tight band. Thus
de jure classifications are prone to regime misalignments, and due primarily to the “fear of floating,” could significantly
misstate the number of intermediate regimes.
Given the difficulty of differentiating between the actual and announced regimes, a number of de facto classification
systems have been proposed. The IMF has begun publishing regime classifications that account for the actual functioning of
regimes as, for example, unsuccessful pegs and tightly managed floats. The classification combines formal and informal policy
declarations on exchange rates and monetary policy with actual exchange rate and reserve movements. Their findings generally
support the bipolar view over the last decade (Refer to Figures 1, 2 and 3). A different approach taken by Reinhart and
Rogoff’s (2004) natural classification, relies on a broad set of descriptive statistics and detailed chronologies of exchange rate
arrangements to group regimes (Rogoff 2004). Their classification uses a comprehensive dataset dating back to 1946 and
shows little support for the bipolar view (Refer to Figure 5). Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) present yet another de facto
classification which employs foreign exchange intervention, reserve data and interest rate movements to classify regimes.
Others use actual exchange rate movements or control for country characteristics.
Regardless of the approach used, de facto classifications have critical conceptual and practical drawbacks. A
prominent pitfall of all de facto classifications systems is their backward looking nature, which fails to capture the signaling
function of announced policy intentions on exchange rate regime choice, which in turn markedly affects economic performance.
Of course, the absence of exchange rate volatility can be due to a lack of adverse shocks rather than to foreign exchange rate
market interventions. Furthermore, economists cannot easily distinguish between interventions undertaken to meet a specific
exchange rate target and those designed to meet other policy objectives such as inflation targeting. Since observed exchange
rate movements are affected by country-specific institutional frameworks and shocks, inferring the underlying actual exchange
rate policy can be quite difficult. For instance, a small open economy with substantial exchange rate volatility can be classified
as a float while a large and diversified economy with lower volatility can be described as a peg. Inferences based on interest
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rate movements can also be misleading since in many developing countries interest rates differ considerably from the market
clearing rate. Additionally, foreign reserves can be affected by foreign debt payments or large military or raw material
purchases rather than exchange rate pressures. In summary, all classification methods are flawed to some extent, vary greatly
from each other, and while there is much room for progress in the future, it is not clear that complex solutions will outperform
the simple de jure one.
This study uses a 15 exchange rate regime, de jure classification monotonically arrayed in terms of peg rigidity, as
compiled by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002)3. Fifteen regimes suggests more precision than can be justified, and as noted above,
risks missing the general picture while getting bogged down with unnecessary detail. Thus, in the empirical analysis we
employ a more compact four regime classification system: hard pegs, comprised of dollarization, currency boards and
monetary unions; soft pegs, composed of single currency and basket pegs; hard floats, encompassing cooperative regimes,
crawling pegs, target bands and managed floats; and free floats (Refer to Table 1). In order to address the aforementioned
uncertainties regarding de jure classifications and verify the robustness of the de jure classification results, we use the same
four way aggregation in terms of the Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) hybrid de facto classification. The authors’ “consensus”
classification removes the observations where the de jure classification does not match a de facto one based on exchange rate
movements. Therefore, this classification reduces the sample by 35 percent over the 1970-1999 period and essentially
eliminates a number of identified hard float and soft peg regimes. Regime classification misalignments are gravest amongst
hard floats where only 30.6 percent of observations are classified as such by both de facto and de jure classifications compared
to 41.5 percent and 80.3 percent for pegs and floats, respectively. Due to the rigorous adoption requirements and high exit costs,
hard pegs are robust with respect to classification. The table below indicates how well the two systems match up.
Regime classification

De facto pegs

De facto hard floats

De facto floats

De jure pegs

80.3% (2265)

42.9% (378)

29.1 (178)

De jure hard floats

15.3% (432)

30.6% (270)

29.2% (179)

4.3% (124)

26.4 (233)

41.5% (254)

De jure floats

Note: numbers in parenthesis show number of observations

While a de jure approach has its drawbacks, often times a simpler and more intuitive approach is more compelling than a
complex one that holds the promise to correct all shortcomings but generates new ones. Since most of the proposed de facto
classifications differ from each other in significant ways as well as when pitted against a de jure classification, in this study we
will focus mainly on the de jure results but will verify their robustness using the hybrid de facto classification proposed by
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002).

3

For classification specifics refer to Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) 40-51.
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V. Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
This study employs a macroeconomic data set used by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000), which is primarily drawn from
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database and the World Bank. The complete dataset consists of
5,010 annual observations and is constructed as a balanced panel of 30 observations per country. The dataset is comprised of
observations from 160 countries over the period 1970-1999. Since in many cases data are missing or invalid, a subset of 1,946
or fewer observations is employed in the regression analysis4. The year a regime change is initiated and the following year is
left out due to unpredictable volatilities. For the regression specification using lagged growth terms additional yearly
observations were dropped in order to ensure non-overlapping of county data. There are a number of drawbacks associated
with using a large sample with its great heterogeneity of experience. A significantly pronounced problem is the lack of
consistency and accuracy in variable measurements over different countries and time periods. A further complication is
implementing functional forms which work successfully for samples consisting of large numbers of countries boasting diverse
economic development patterns. Thus broad-paneled data set studies rely on the trust that strong underlying economic signals
from the diversity of experiences will be able to overcome the general noise (Barro 2002).
Countries with hard pegged exchange rate regimes represent 13.2 percent of the full sample observations whereas
countries with soft pegged, hard floating and floating exchange rate regimes constitute 52.2, 20.8 and 14.2 percent, respectively.
The observations of countries with hard pegs in the regression analysis sample include Antigua & Barbuda (1981-1999),
Argentina (1991-1999), Dominica (1978-1999), Djibouti (1978), Estonia (1992-1999), Grenada (1977-1999), Hong Kong
(1983-1999), Lithuania (1980-1999), St. Lucia (1980-1999), and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1980-1999). The number of
hard peg observations are 115 and 46 for the inflation and growth regressions, respectively. Table 2 describes some of the most
important characteristics of the currency boards in existence in 1997. In general, a currency board is defined by four main
characteristics: sufficient backing of the domestic currency by the anchor currency, freedom of conversion of domestic
currency into the reserve currency at a fixed rate, a formal institutional arrangement and restricted monetary policy. A glance at
the table verifies that the rigor of arrangements vary widely in practice and inevitably fall short of the orthodox idea. Argentina
was an example of a currency board with fairly flexible arrangement that allows partial cover of domestic assets while Estonia
and Bulgaria boast stringent arrangements. Hanke (2002) focuses on the departures from orthodoxy of modern currency
boards and finds that only Bosnia meets the required reserve requirement of 100-115%, and only Bulgaria does not regulate
commercial banks. Finally, none supply just coins and notes. Hanke claims that the modern arrangements are, in fact, not

4

Since the regression sample does not include any monetary union observations (Refer to table 1), it is safe to assume in the
regression analysis that hard pegs denote just currency board and dollarization observations.

10
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol1/iss1/3

10

Mandadjiev: Inflation, Growth and Crisis Performance of Hard Pegged Exchange

currency boards. It is, however, unlikely that any country will be willing to completely forgo a monetary authority with
discretionary powers in order to be bound by the rules of orthodoxy.
Table 3 and figure 7 present the descriptive statistics for the integral variables used in this study and divide the data
into specific samples for all four exchange rate regimes. Evaluating the mean and median inflation rates across regimes allows
us to verify that hard pegged exchange rate regimes enjoy the best inflation performance followed by soft pegged, floating and
hard floating exchange rate regimes. Hard pegs, closely followed by soft pegs, achieve the least money growth which signifies
the importance of monetary discipline in order to support the peg. GDP growth summary statistics across regimes are quite
similar with hard pegged regimes performing well despite their constraints of virtually nonexistent monetary policy. Pegged
regimes achieve larger deficits compared to floating regimes which is theoretically sound because restrictions on monetary
policy lead authorities to use fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. Hard pegs attain the lowest turnover rates for central bank
directors which signify general central bank stability and independence. It is also worth noting that hard pegged regimes boast
the greatest ratio of imports and exports to GDP which signifies their superior trade openness with respect to other regimes.
Hard floating exchange regimes offer the worst inflation performance but competitive growth performance. This can be
attributed to lower central bank credibility and inconsistent or flawed exchange rate interventions which are often associated
with floating regimes implementing discretionary or rule based interventions.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics across different sub-samples. Hard pegs consistently outperform the other
regimes with respect to money growth and inflation and offer surprisingly strong growth performance. The performance of
hard pegged regimes is quite comparable with floating regimes in high income and low inflation counties, which is hardly
surprising since such countries generally boast strong economies capable of withstanding exchange rate and inflationary shocks
and would not benefit greatly from adopting a peg for that purpose. As expected, hard pegs fare very well in the sub-samples of
inflation-ridden and low income observations. One explanation for the considerable discrepancy between the inflation and
growth performance of hard pegs and floats is the de jure regime classification where some of the reported floats in fact behave
as either pegs or hard floats. A second claim is that low income or high inflation countries usually lack the appropriate
institutional framework that could enable them to take full advantage of a floating exchange rate.
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VI. Inflation Regression
To examine the link between the exchange rate regime and inflation, this study will employ a regression specification with
scaled5 inflation, Π, as the dependent variable:
Π = β0 + β1Hardpeg + β2Softpeg + β3Hardfloat + β4MG + β5GDPG + β6Turn + β7Open + β8GovBal + β9TTG + β10Year
(-)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(-)
Hardpeg: dummy variable representing currency board or dollarization; Softpeg: dummy variable representing pegs tied to a
single currency or a basket of currencies; Hardfloat: dummy variable denoting floating exchange rate regimes featuring rulebased or discretionary interventions.; MG: stands for the yearly broad money growth rate; GDPG: denotes yearly real GDP
growth rate; Turn: represents the five-year average turnover rate of the central bank’s governor in the particular country and is
used as an inverse proxy for central bank independence (Cukierman 1992); Open: stands for the ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP and is used as a measure of yearly trade openness. GovBal: represents a three-year backward average of the annual
governmental budget balance as a percent of GDP; TTG: accounts for a three-year backward average of the growth of termsof-trade shocks indicating the growth rate of export prices to import prices (Fischer 1993); Year: denotes the difference
between the sample end date and the year of the observation and accounts for global inflation shocks and other identified
yearly effects.
Since no dummy explanatory variable is specified for floats, which are selected as the baseline exchange rate regime,
the coefficients on the other exchange rate regime variables should be interpreted as the inflation differential relative to a
floating exchange rate. Institution of a hard pegged regime is expected to enhance monetary discipline, further Central Bank
credibility, lower insecurity, and boost overall economic stability, and thus, foster superior inflation performance relative to
other regimes. Due to the credibility-raising uncertainty-lowering effects of adopting an exchange rate peg, soft pegged
regimes are expected to fare better than floats with regard to inflation. Hard floats have poor inflation performance due to
pressures on servicing exchange rate bands or inadequate interventions, driven by short term perspectives, associated with such
regimes. Faster money growth, widely recognized as a main driver of inflation, is associated with higher inflation. By
assumption, we anticipate higher real GDP growth to reduce inflation by raising money demand. A high turnover rate for the
central bank governor is associated with higher inflation on grounds that governors of central banks who report to political
leaders can be subjected to unsubstantiated dismissals. Economic theory and factual observation suggest that relatively
independent central banks are associated with better inflation performance relative to relatively dependent banks. Greater trade
openness is hypothesized to raise the cost of a monetary expansion, which implies lower inflation in more open economies

5

Since inflation and money growth rates can be severely skewed by a small number of outliers, Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) impose the
scaling given by X = X/(1+X), where X is money growth or inflation, to address outliers.
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(Roemer 1993). Further, import inflows often put downward pressure on prices. Large governmental surpluses are theorized to
lead to lower inflation because of reduced aggregate demand pressures and direct money financing. The higher the growth of
export prices to import prices, the lower inflation rates are expected to be. Further we added lagged variables for broad money
growth to account for the lag structure of monetary policy implementation which is presumed to range from roughly 18 to 24
months.

Inflation Regression Results
The first two columns of Table 5 present a summary of the inflation regression specification results using a de jure exchange
rate classification. The signs of all the coefficients for the explanatory variables accord with this study’s initial hypotheses.
Further, most variables enter the equation with significant coefficients with the exception of soft pegs and money growth
lagged two years. Soft peg’s insignificant coefficient could be attributed to the shortcomings of the de jure classification, this
study’s sample, or the particular grouping of exchange rate regimes especially since soft pegs account for more than half of all
observations. As expected, hard pegs emerge as the best inflation performer and offer a 3.5 percentage points lower inflation
rate compared to floating regimes. Hard floats do considerably worse than floats; on average they generate 2.8 percentage
points higher inflation than floating regimes. The money growth and lagged money growth estimates exhibit an expected very
strong positive effect on the dependent variable. With the exception of the second lagged term, these variables are also strongly
significant. The GDP growth rate variable boasts the largest coefficient among all variables and reflects a markedly strong
negative causal relationship between output growth and inflation. The coefficient estimates of the other explanatory variables
are in line with our initial hypothesis: countries with more open economies, larger positive fiscal balances, and countries with
more independent central banks exhibiting lower inflation than their counterparts.
The third and fourth columns in table 5 portray the results when replacing the de jure classification with a de facto
classification. There are negligible changes in the coefficients of the non-exchange rate variables. Under the de facto
classification, the inflation performance of hard pegged regimes is estimated at 4.4 percentage points better than that of floats
regardless of the fact that there are almost no classification misalignments amongst hard peg observations. The soft pegs
variable endures the most substantial change across classification methods; its coefficient is found to be significant and almost
three times higher than the one estimated under the de jure classification. Such a change can be clearly attributed to badly
performing floats and hard floats classified as soft pegs by the de jure classification. Hard floats’ coefficient loses almost half
of its value relative to the de jure estimate but is now found to be insignificant, which can be attributed to some amount of
poorly performing misclassified regimes leaving the hard float category.
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Table 6 presents estimates of the inflation regression results across eight different sub samples. It is noteworthy that
the exchange rate regime variables never switch coefficient signs across the two classification methods with the exception of
hard floats in the capital and current account restrictions samples. But in this sub-sample neither estimate differs significantly
from zero. Overall, the de facto and de jure estimations are quite comparable in terms of coefficient magnitudes, but the de
facto variables tend to have lower standard errors (higher t-statistics). Both hard pegs and soft pegs are estimated with signs
which are in reverse to the initial hypothesis only in the upper income industrialized countries. A possible explanation is that
upper income countries enjoy the benefits of a strong institutional framework to begin with, and a peg will not contribute in
any way to their inflation performance. Amongst the other sub-samples, the inflation premium of hard pegs ranges in between
1.3 and 12.9 percentage points. In the upper-middle income and lower income categories pegged exchange rates, especially
hard pegs exhibit superior inflation performance relative to both floats and hard floats. The inflation performance of de jure
pegged regimes is weak amongst low inflation observations but significant for de facto pegs. The inflation performance of hard
pegs is solid and significant amongst observations featuring capital and current account restrictions but surprisingly verges on
the margins of significance amongst observations of very open economies. To sum up, hard pegs exhibit very strong inflation
performance which is robust across diverse samples and two classification methods.
There are certain concerns about the regression estimates which one needs to bear in mind when analyzing the results.
A Durbin-Watson test statistic of 0.8 and a White test conducted on our sample data indicated autocorrected errors and
heteroskedasticity problems. These shortcomings were addressed by employing a Newey-West correction of the regression
equation standard errors. The possibility of a specification error was flagged by a Ramsey reset test for omitted variable bias.
The introduction of lagged money growth terms is an attempt to rectify this problem. The additional variables introduced
notable changes to the coefficients and standard errors of some of the other variables and slightly raised the adjusted R-squared,
which is indicative of their explanatory power. Due to unavailable data, we are unable to include certain variables pertaining to
country specific institutional frameworks such as proxies for a democratic political system, pervasiveness of corruption, and
legal system efficiency, amongst others. Nevertheless, given confidence in the theoretical soundness and the functional form
of the proposed specification, this study is willing to trade meeting the first classical assumption for simplicity of interpretation
by not expanding the list of explanatory variables further.

Exchange Rate Regime Unconditional on Money Growth
Guided by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf, one needs to take account of the possibility of money growth being endogenous to the
exchange rate regime. Because money growth is one of the explanatory variables in the regression specification, any indirect
effects of the exchange rate regime set forth by money growth will not be accounted for by the coefficients of the exchange
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regime variables. Assume that money growth is dependent on the exchange rate dummies and inflation depends on money
growth:
MG = α0 + α 1Hardpeg + α 2Softpeg + α 3Hardfloat + e
Π = β0 + β1Hardpeg + β2Softpeg + β3Hardfloat + β4MG + β5GDPG + β6Turn + β7Open + β8GovBal + β9TTG + β10Year
The confidence effect of instituting a hard pegged exchange rate regime, which is the direct effect of the regime on inflation of
holding money growth constant, is given by the β1 coefficient. The discipline effect, which is the indirect effect of the
exchange rate institution on inflation through a money growth channel, is supplied by β4 α 1. Since Hardpeg is a dichotomous
variable an estimate of α 1 can be obtained from the difference in the average growth rates of the money supply under hard
pegged and floating regimes (likewise for the other regimes) . Thus the full effect of the hard pegged exchange rate regime on
inflation is given by combining the confidence and discipline effects (likewise for the other regimes). If this method is applied
to results from inflation regression and the descriptive statistics (Tables 3 and 5) we obtain:
Regime
Hardpeg

Confidence effect
-0.035

Discipline effect

Full effect

-0.011

-0.046

Softpeg

-0.008

-0.006

-0.014

Hardfloat

0.028

0.017

0.045

Therefore correcting for the endogeneity of money growth to the exchange rate regime and considering the indirect discipline
effect, the variables for pegged regimes become larger negatives, with hard pegs offering a 4.6 percentage points lower
inflation relative to floats, whereas the variable for hard floats becomes a larger positive climbing to 4.5 percentage points
higher inflation relative to floats. This result shows that the inflation performance of pegged regimes is significantly stronger
than it appears and more than half of the full inflation premium can be attributed to the discipline effect of restricted monetary
policy set forth by the exchange rate regime adoption.

Endogeneity of Regime Choice
The decision to adopt a specific exchange rate regime can depend on a variety of factors such as inflation preferences, optimal
response to shocks, and economic integration with other countries. This raises the question of causality: countries with a low
proclivity to inflation may be more likely to adopt hard pegged regimes. We employ a Granger causality test on hard pegs and
inflation and find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that hard pegs do not Granger-cause inflation but can reject the
opposite null hypothesis; thus we have little evidence of reverse causality. The table below presents the results of the Granger
causality test using five lagged terms. The result is robust to changing the lagged terms and while the probabilities change
slightly, we can never reject the first hypothesis or fail to reject the second one.
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Null Hypothesis

F-Statistic

Probability

Hard Pegs does not Granger Cause Inflation

8.323

0.001

Inflation does not Granger Cause Hard Pegs

0.106

0.990

In order to empirically address endogeneity concerns, we employ a simultaneous equation model with a dichotomous
regime classification. Hard pegs are the only explanatory regime variable, and the others are assumed to be part of the constant
term because it is difficult to find plausible instruments that can correctly distinguish between different exchange rate regimes.
Such a specification can be useful for conducting a two stage simultaneous equation framework that estimates the residual
effect of a hard pegged exchange rate regime on inflation filtering out the endogeneity of regime choice. The results of the
proposed two-stage estimation, however, will not be comparable to the baseline inflation OLS results, where the rest of the
exchange rate regimes were not grouped together. Thus we estimate an OLS for this dichotomous classification in order to
provide a suitable benchmark. We propose a first stage probit binary estimation where a hard peg depends on the inflation rate
and a vector of other characteristics. The instruments include the exogenous variables from the baseline specification plus
population size. Exchange rate theory suggests that countries with small populations are more likely to adopt pegged exchange
rates, thus rendering population size a good predictor of regime choice changes since there is little reason to believe that
country size influences inflation.
The results of the first stage probit are presented in the left panel of Table 7, where population exhibits the expected
strong negative effect on hard pegged exchange regime adoption. The results of the two stage simultaneous equation procedure
do not differ substantially from the dichotomous classification OLS results (Refer to the right panel of Table 7). The two-stage
process estimates hard pegs with a greater standard error (lower t-statistic) and a coefficient lower by one percentage point
compared with the OLS estimate. Nonetheless, the coefficient has the anticipated sign and is strongly significant. None of the
other variables registers noteworthy changes in their coefficients and standard errors (t-statistics). Thus, stripping away the
endogeneity of regime choice does not affect hard pegged exchange rate regimes’ competitiveness in inflation performance in
relation to the other regimes. These findings suggest that the superior inflation performance of hard pegs compared to the other
regimes can be attributed to the specific operation, confidence and discipline effects of the hard pegs, rather than to the
county’s lower propensity to inflation which leads to adopting a stringent exchange peg.

VII. Growth Regression
The exemplary inflation performance of hard pegged regimes shown in the previous section, along with monetary discipline,
policy credibility effects and the creation of a trustworthy institutional framework associated with them, suggests that hard pegs
may also engender remarkable growth performance. Growth, however, much more so than inflation, is bound to depend on
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factors other than the exchange rate regimes as a plethora of determinants have been proposed in the growth literature (Barro
2002). The second set of regressions in this study attempt to find whether the rigidity associated with hard peg institutions
lead to superior inflation performance at the cost of economic growth. We employ a regression specification with GDP per
capita growth, ∆y

pc

as the dependent variable.

∆y pc = β0 + β1Hardpeg + β2Softpeg + β3Hardfloat + β4Educ + β5 Π + β6I +
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-) (+)
β7Tax + β8GovBal + β9TTG + β10Open + β11Popg + β12Poplog + β13Gap + β14Year
(-)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)
Hardpeg: is a dummy variable representing a currency board or dollarization; Softpeg: is a dummy variable representing
adjustable pegs such as single currency or a basket pegs; Hardfloat: the final dummy variable, denotes floating exchange rate
regimes featuring rule-based or discretionary interventions; Educ: represents the average educational attainment of males over
25 years of age; Π: stands for the level of inflation; I: represents the investment to GDP ratio for a given country in a given
year; Tax: stands for the country’s budget revenue as a percentage of GDP; GovBal: represents a three-year backward average
of the annual governmental balance as a percent of GDP; TTG: accounts for a three-year backward average of the growth of
inflationary terms-of-trade shocks indicating the growth rate of export prices to import prices; Open: represents the ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP as measure of the yearly trade openness of the particular country; Pop: represents current year’s
population growth. Poplog: stands for the log of the level of population in the given country. Gap: the log of the ratio of the
country’s initial per capita GDP to that of the United States, both based on international prices in 1970; Year denotes the
difference between the sample end date and the year of the observation and accounts for global inflation shocks and other
identified yearly volatilities.
Since no dummy explanatory variable is specified for floats, which are selected as the baseline exchange rate regime,
the coefficients on the other exchange rate regime variables should be interpreted as the growth differential relative to that for a
floating exchange rate. Mainly due to credibility effects and the promise of a credible and reliable institutional framework
which is theorized to foster economic integration and growth, hard pegs are expected to be conducive to higher growth relative
to floats. Given the negatives associated with exchange rate pegging, consistent with the impossible trinity, we expect soft pegs
to fare worse than floats with regard to output growth. We expect strong growth performance from hard floating regimes, since
they can employ discretionary policies to stabilize or stimulate the economy and generally boast lower exchange rate volatility
than floats. Human capital accumulation is a necessary neoclassical ingredient for growth, and educational attainment is
expected to be highly conducive to growth. Further, we expect countries with low inflation, low tax burden, large budget
surpluses and high investment rates to be conducive to high economic growth. A rise in the terms of trade shocks, or the
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growth of export prices to import prices, can be associated with increases in productivity and factor utilization which have a
positive impact on output growth. Trade openness reflects classical comparative advantage and tends to accelerate international
specialization, production efficiency and the transfer of technical knowledge. The openness measure employed in this study,
however, tends to be highly sensitive and inversely related to population size since larger economies rely significantly more on
domestic trade. Increased workforce growth reduces the capital and output per worker, and as the number of children per
person rises, output growth is expected to fall. Increased population size is expected to be conducive to growth since the
domestic market will be larger and the country will be less dependent on trade for generating output growth. The log is
imposed to counter the effects of size for the two recent prominent outliers: India and China. Initial income accounts for
convergence or “catch-up” effects. We expect conditional convergence of income with higher growth in response to lower
initial GDP per capita provided that all other structural variables that are highly correlated with per capita GDP variables are
held constant. We anticipate a negative sign for this variable since initial income accounts for the hypothesis that the growth
rate of an economy is positively related to the distance between the economy’s level of income and its long term steady state
income.

Growth Regression Results
The first two columns of Table 8 present the results of the growth regression results using a de jure classification. Hard pegs
are estimated to have 0.1 percentage point growth premium relative to floats, but the variable has an insignificant coefficient.
Since hard pegged regimes showed strong growth performance in the descriptive statistics, one may question the insignificance
of this coefficient. Compared with the inflation regression, the growth regression was run with a smaller sample due mainly to
missing educational attainment observations. Although the sample size diminished by only 164 observations, the number of
hard pegged regime observations have been reduced by more than half to 46 observations compared to the inflation
regression’s 119. This result, however, is consistent with the theoretical literature which suggests that the exchange rate
regimes, in general, do not exhibit a strong relationship with per capita output growth. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) claim that the
choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the development of good fiscal, financial, and
monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic success in developing market economies.
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) present an additional reason behind the poor performance. Since trade openness,
inflation and the investment rate are present as variables in the specification, the indirect effects of the hard pegged exchange
rate regime on growth operating through the channel of these variables will not be fully accounted for by its coefficient.
Following the computation technique presented in the inflation regression, we find that combining these indirect effects results
in hard pegs gaining a 5 percent growth premium over floats. The bulk of this change comes from the difference in openness
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between hard pegs and floats since the investment and inflation rate differentials are small and cancel each other out (Refer to
table 3). The measure of openness, as noted above, used in this study heavily over-represents small, reliant on trade, countries.
Since the entire set of hard peg observations is essentially composed of small open economies, the validity of this result is
highly questionable.
The coefficients for soft pegs and hard floats are negative and positive, respectively, as predicted, but only that for
hard floats is found to be significant. As reinforced by the impossible trinity, soft pegs are not particularly conducive to growth;
furthermore, the statistical significance is not particularly strong in the negative direction. The significant performance of hard
floats can be attributed to the intermediate nature of the regime which allows fine tuning with response to shocks and a full
arsenal of stabilization and stimulation tools. With exception of insignificant coefficients on the taxation and terms of trade
variables, all other explanatory variables are estimated with the expected signs and are significant. The considerably strong
negative impact of population growth can be attributed to the sample period where almost all high growth and income
countries exhibited very low population growth. The rapidly declining population growth in the developed world, positive due
mostly to rising immigration, generates a serious problem in the future when the retirement age population will be large
compared to the working age population. As a result, the benefits offered under current social security and retirement funds
may not be sustainable.
Estimating the robustness of the de jure classification findings we re-estimate the regression employing the hybrid de
facto one. Minimal changes result from the elimination of misaligned exchange rate regimes. Except for the soft pegs variable,
whose coefficient changes sign but remains insignificant, there are no noteworthy changes amongst the exchange rate regime
variables. The budget balance variable’s coefficient registers a modest gain of about 2.5 percentage points, and the investment
rate variable’s coefficient falls by about 2.3 percentage point while trade openness variable losses its significance.
Table 9 presents an attempt to estimate whether the growth regression results are robust across a number different subsamples. It is noteworthy that the exchange rate regime coefficients are not only prone to switching coefficient signs across
sub-samples but also with respect to classification method. Across classification methods, both hard floats and soft pegs
variables benefit form the removal of misaligning regimes in terms of both coefficient magnitude and t-statistic significance.
Similar to the results presented in the inflation section, hard pegs are found to be a significant negative contributor to growth in
the low inflation and high income sub-samples. The growth performance of hard pegs is surprisingly weak in the low and lowmiddle income segment, but quite strong in the upper-middle income sample (de facto classification). These results can be
attributed to the fact that hard pegged regimes require the suitable base of a functioning market economy and solid financial
framework in order for the regime to be successful. The growth performance of countries under capital and current account
restrictions appears to benefit from the institution of a hard peg. To sum up, exchange rate regimes fail to exhibit any particular
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strong causal link with output growth and the results are not spectacular. Thus, hard pegs fare no worse that floats or adjustable
pegs, but hard floats appear to provide the strongest growth performance, especially under the de facto classification.
Due to dataset constraints, the growth regression lacks certain variables that have a noteworthy potential for
explaining output growth. The validity of this claim is reinforced by a Ramsey reset test which signified possible omitted
variable bias. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) suggest that a large share of variation in output growth can be explained by
inclusion of geographical variables such as tropical geography and the proportion of the population living within 100
kilometers of the sea coast. Further potential explanatory variables, suggested by Barro (2004), include proxies for a
democratic political system, predominance of Islam, a colonial past, population fragmentation, the pervasiveness of corruption,
legal system efficiency and healthcare quality. Although the inclusion of meaningful extra variables would most definitely
raise the explanatory power of the regression, we believe that it is unlikely to alter the primary findings of this study since
exchange rate regime choice acts independently of such variables. Possible problems of autocorrected errors and
heteroskedasticity were addressed by employing a Newey-West correction of the regression equation standard errors.
Initially we hypothesized that hard pegs would offer growth performance comparable to that of floats. Hence the
aforementioned results do not come as a great surprise since the stringent nature of a hard pegged regime severely restricts
monetary policy. Nonetheless, hard pegs’ outstanding inflation performance and satisfactory growth performance propels them
as the more attractive corner exchange rate solution relative to floats.

VIII. Stability
In the last decade developed countries have witnessed historically unusual stability. The British have named the last ten years
the “nice” decade of non-inflationary consistent expansion, while Americans speak of the “Great Modernization” (Martin and
Rowthorn 2004). Stability is of considerable importance because it affects the behavior of securities markets and reduces
uncertainties plaguing citizens, corporate planners and policymakers. Yet, there exists considerable disagreement among
theorists on the causes and effects of stability. Some economists believe that economies have made significant progress
towards natural self-stabilization; others claim that it is improvements in handling of inflation pressures and monetary policy
that have been primary contributors to economic stability (Martin and Rowthorn 2004). In contrast, pessimists like James Stock
and Mark Watson, economics professors at Harvard and Princeton, play down developmental achievements and successful
policy and claim that recent stability was due to sheer luck (Martin and Rowthorn 2004).
Due to the recent controversy related to the bipolar view of exchange rates and the impossible trinity, it is of particular
interest to investigate whether these corner exchange rate regimes stand out as defenders of stability compared to intermediate
solutions. The crisis episodes in Mexico (1994), Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea (1997), Russia and Brazil (1998), Ecuador
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(1999), and Turkey (2000) have led to the perception that adjustable fixed exchange rate regimes are inherently fragile and
crisis prone (Fischer 2001; Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002). Following the collapse of Argentina’s currency board, the stability
of hard pegs has been questioned as well. Currency crises under pegged regimes are quite apparent since they often culminate
in an exit from the peg. On the other hand, a currency crisis under a floating regime can yield a sharp depreciation from credit
expansions and short turn stimulus to the economy (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002). Pegged exchange rate regimes are theorized
to be more prone to banking crises since they are associated with unlimited foreign currency exposure and restrict the ability of
the central bank to act as a lender of last resort. Excessive borrowing can, however, be counteracted by prudential measures,
and the absence of lender of last resort functions implies low moral hazard risks (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002).
In this study we employ four measures of stability in order to determine which exchange rate regime is least crisis
prone: volatility of inflation and growth, likelihood of banking and currency crises episodes, and the likelihood of severe
recessions. We use the standard deviation to estimate the volatility of inflation and growth rates around their averages. Martin
and Rowthorn (2004) claim that using other measures is likely to affect unimportant details and detract focus from the broad
picture. For measures of currency and banking crises, we employ data established by Glick and Hutchison (1999). Banking
crises are defined as a combination of measures of non-performing assets and institutional events such as: forced closures,
mergers, governmental intervention in the operations of financial institutions, and runs on banks. Currency crises are defined as
large changes in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and
monthly reserve losses. Consistent with Eichengreen’s argument that a typical financial crisis claims about 9 percent of GDP,
we define recession episodes as observations with growth rates 1.5 standard deviations below the general sample mean or close
to a negative 10 percent growth.
Table 10 and Figures 8 and 9 reveal the individual exchange rate regime inflation and growth volatilities under both
classification methods. Using the de jure classification, pegged exchange rate regimes exhibit markedly lower inflation and
money growth volatilities than hard floats and free floats. Hard pegs offer the best performance while free floats fare the worst.
The de facto classification reveals a comparatively lower volatility for adjustable pegs and notably higher volatility associated
with hard and pure floating regimes. Due to the irrevocable commitment of hard pegs and the lack of classification
misalignments, their performance stays the same across classification methods. Under the de jure classification hard pegs and
hard floats exhibit the lowest growth volatilities. The de facto classification reveals that hard floats and soft pegs appear to
benefit from the removal of misaligned regimes, while free floats are associated with even higher growth volatility. Overall,
hard pegs offer strong stability performance while free floats trail considerably behind the other regimes.
Table 11 and Figure 10 present the individual exchange rate regimes performance with respect to several instability
measures under the de jure classification method. Amongst pegged regimes just 2% of observations reflect the beginning of
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banking crises compared to hard floats and pure floats which average 4% and 7%, respectively. Considering all banking crisis
observations (not just beginnings), hard pegs offer the least ratio of crises to non-crises episodes while floats offer the worst.
Hard pegs stand out with particularly low currency crisis occurrences and total currency crisis episodes, which can be
attributed to the monetary stability and abundant foreign currency reserves associated with the regime. Hard floats register
about twice as many crisis episodes as soft pegs and free floats fare even worse. With respect to severe recession episodes of
less than minus 10 percent growth, hard floats offer the best performance, followed closely by both hard and soft pegged
regimes. Table 12 and Figure 11 present the crisis performance of exchange rate regimes under the de facto classification
method. The results for hard pegged regimes do not change, while soft pegs and hard floats register consistently better results.
Similar to the volatility results, removing misaligned regimes results in free floats appearing significantly more crisis prone
with respect to all measures of instability.
We find that hard pegged exchange rate regimes offer a very strong and consistent stability performance. While
falling behind hard floating exchange rate regimes with respect to severe recessions and growth volatility, soft and hard pegged
regimes appear to be considerably less crisis prone compared to both floating regimes. This finding is in stark contrast with the
widespread view that fixed exchange rate regimes are fragile and prone to collapse. On the other hand, the paltry performance
of free floating exchange rate regimes is rather surprising. Eliminating misaligned regimes consistently results in poorer
performance of free floats which signifies that the best performing de jure floats are in fact intermediate or fixed exchange rate
regimes. The poor performance of free floats reveals that developing countries have a very good reason to fear floating. We
conclude that the flexible pole of the bipolar view is hard to recommend, which leaves hard pegs as the only viable corner
solution for developing countries.

IX. Conclusion
Exchange rate regimes are theoretically constrained by the impossible trinity of exchange rate stability, monetary policy
autonomy, and freedom of capital movement. Increasing capital mobility has led many economists to theorize that exchange
rate regimes will eventually abandon the crisis prone intermediate regimes and move towards the two poles of hard pegs and
free floats. Hard pegs have recently regained popularity as exchange rate solutions for developing countries due to the recent
adoptions of currency board arrangements by Argentina (1991), Estonia (1992), Lithuania (1994), Bosnia (1997) and Bulgaria
(1997). While the validity of the bipolar view and the historical accuracy of the monetary policy trilemma has been
undermined by the recent collapse of Argentina’s currency board and the prevalent fear of floating, even skeptics agree that
hard pegs have performed quite well for developing countries. In contrast, the benefit of allowing an exchange rate to float is
theorized to grow as the country’s output per capita level rises (Rogoff 2004). In this study we evaluate the performance of
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hard pegged regimes with respect to inflation, growth and crisis proneness by employing both de facto and de jure exchange
rate classifications. The inflation levels for countries under hard pegged exchange rates are estimated by regression analysis to
be 3.5% lower than those under floating exchange rates. When we incorporate the indirect effect of regime institution on
inflation through money growth channels, the inflation performance premium of hard pegged exchange rate regimes increases
to 4.6% lower inflation relative to floating exchange rate regimes. When we account for possible endogeneity of regime choice
with respect to inflation, the regression estimates significantly better inflation performance for hard pegged regimes compared
to floating exchange rate regimes. Having found no evidence of reverse causality, we theorize that the inflation performance
premium of hard pegged is due to the credibility and discipline effects associated with the regime rather than the particular
country’s intrinsic propensity for low inflation. This study also finds significant evidence that the growth performance of
pegged exchange rate regime is on par with that of floating regimes and that the outstanding performance does not come at a
growth cost. Furthermore, hard pegged regimes offer outstanding stability performance with respect to measures such as
inflation and growth volatilities, proneness to severe recessions, proneness to banking and financial crises. In stark contrast,
floating exchange rate regimes appear particularly crisis prone. Moreover, accounting for misaligned exchange rate regimes
leads to even worse performance of floating regimes which indicates pervasive fear of floating. In short, we find that hard
pegged exchange rate regimes provide excellent performance for developing countries, which appear justified in fearing
floating.
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Regimes in the 90’s De Facto classification
(number of countries in parenthesis)

Source: IMF estimates, Fischer (2001)

Figure 2: Exchange Rate Regimes in the 90’s De Facto Classification
Distribution and Crisis Proneness

Source: Estimates by Bubula and Otrker-Robe (2004)
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Figure 3: IMF De Facto Regime Distribution, 1990–2001
(in percent of annual observations)

Source: Rogoff (2004)

Figure 4: De Jure Regime Distribution, 1970–1999
(in percent of annual observations)

Source: Rogoff (2004); Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002)
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Figure 5: Natural Classification Regime Distribution, 1940–2001
(in percent of annual observations)

Source: Rogoff (2004)
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Figure 6: The Impossible Trilemma

Exchange Rate Stability

Capital Controls

Monetary Policy
Autonomy

Currency Board

Floating Exchange Rate

Freedom of Capital
Movement

The vertices of the triangle represent the three goals that
policymakers in open economies would like to achieve while the
sides stand for policy regimes. Only one of the sides can be
chosen and it is consistent with the goals that lie on its edges,
and inconsistent with the goal lying opposite to it.
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Table 1: Exchange Rate Regimes Classification in Terms of Peg Rigidity

Classification

Sub classification

Regime
Dollarized Regimes
(Foreign currency is used as legal tender; no domestic monetary policy. )

Pegged
(Exchange rate’s
value does not vary
in terms of an anchor
currency or
commodity.)

Hard Pegs
(Exchange rate is pegged in a manner
that changes in parity or exit from the
regime is costly and difficult.)

Monetary Union
(A group of countries uses a common currency issued by a common regional bank;
monetary policy is determined by the regional bank.)
Adjustable Pegs/ Soft Pegs
(Currency is linked to a single or
currency or a basket of currencies.
Cost of adjustment or exit is sufficiently
lower than that of hard pegs.)

Hard Floats
(Exchange rate
floats but due to
central bank
interventions in the
foreign exchange
markets it stays
within predetermined
bounds. )

Floats
(Exchange rate is
allowed to float
freely.)

Currency Boards
( Exchange rate is pegged to an anchor currency; limited monetary policy; required minimum
of foreign reserves; irrevocable official commitment to uphold the regime.)

Floats With rule-based intervention
( Exchange rate is not begged at a
specific rate but the central bank
intervenes in a predetermined level to
affect exchange rate movements.)

Single Currency Pegs
(Exchange rate is pegged to a fixed par-value to a single foreign currency but is adjustable;
higher reserves increase credibility.)
Basket Pegs
(Like single currency peg, except that the currency is pegged to a basket of two or more
currencies.)
Cooperative Regimes
(Cooperating central banks keep the bilateral exchange rates within a preset range of each
other; adjustment is done via limited monetary policy or interventions.)
Crawling Pegs
(Exchange rate is determined in a rule-based manner, adjusting at a predetermined rate or
as a function of inflation differentials.)
Target Zones and Bands
(Exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within a preset range and excess pressure at the
margin is countered with interventions.)

Floats With discretionary
intervention
( Exchange rate is floating but heavy
official interventions are administered.)

Managed Floats
(Exchange rates are allowed to float but authorities reserve the right to discretionary
interventions; often accompanied by a separate nominal anchor such as inflation targeting.)

Free Floats
(Exchange rate is allowed to float freely
with little or no central bank
intervention.)

Floats
(Exchange rate is determined in the foreign exchange market with little official intervention;
unfettered monetary policy; no foreign reserve requirements; often accompanied by inflation
targeting. )

Source: Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002)
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Table 2: Principal Characteristics of Currency Boards in Operation

Country

Years in
operation

Peg currency

Antigua and Barbuda

32

U.S. dollar

Argentina

6

U.S. dollar

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

1

deutsche mark

Brunei Darussalam

30

Singapore dollar

Special features
Member of East
Caribbean Central
Bank (ECCB)
One-third of coverage
can be in U.S. dollardenominated
government bonds

Minimum Cover
60% of M0

6

M0
100% of the
monetary liabilities
of the Central
bank
100% of the
monetary liabilities
of the Central
bank

Latest Actual
Cover
81.7% of M0,
12% of M2
105% of M0,
21.3% of M2
100% of the
monetary
liabilities of the
Central bank
80% of Central
Bank's demand
liabilities

Bulgaria

1

deutsche mark

Excess coverage in
banking department to
deal with banking
sector weaknesses

Djibouti

48

U.S. dollar

Switched peg currency
from French franc to
U.S. dollar

100% of currency
in circulation

125% of M0,
22.5% of M2

Dominica

32

U.S. dollar

Member of ECCB

60% of M0

84% of M0,
14.7% of M2

Estonia

6

deutsche mark

Excess coverage for
domestic monetary
interventions

M0

118% of M0,
43.5% of M2

Grenada

32

U.S. dollar

Member of ECCB

60% of M0

Hong Kong

14

U.S. dollar

Lithuania

4

U.S. dollar

Central bank has the
right to appreciate the
exchange rate

105% of notes and
coins
M0 plus liquid
central bank
liabilities

St. Kitts and Nevis

32

U.S. dollar

Member of ECCB

60% of M0

St. Lucia

32

U.S. dollar

Member of ECCB

60% of M0

St. Vincent and the
Grenadines

32

U.S. dollar

Member of ECCB

60% of M0

M0 plus some
desired excess
coverage

134% of M0,
40.5% of M2

85% of M0,
15.6% of M2
408% of M0,
22.4% of M2
91.8% of M0,
41.1 % of M2
99% of M0, 19.8
% of M2
95% of M0, 16%
of M2
88% of M0,
15.3% of M2

Source: Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1997); MAE, Balino, Enoch, and Stella (1997)

6

M0 equals reserve money- the sum of currency in circulation plus non-government demand liabilities.
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Table 3 : Descriptive Statistics across Exchange Rate Regimes

Money
Growth
Inflation
Output
Growth
Investment
Budget
Balance
Budget
Revenue
Trade
Openness
Population
Growth
Turnover
Rate
Observations

Full Sample
mean median

Hard pegs
mean
median

Soft Pegs
mean
median

Hard Floats
mean
median

Floats
mean
median

0.150

0.130

0.104

0.112

0.125

0.110

0.227

0.190

0.152

0.122

0.105

0.072

0.046

0.034

0.086

0.064

0.168

0.111

0.111

0.074

0.018

0.021

0.030

0.031

0.014

0.018

0.026

0.028

0.017

0.020

0.223

0.216

0.250

0.250

0.222

0.215

0.233

0.228

0.207

0.203

-0.040

-0.032

-0.035

-0.022

-0.045

-0.037

-0.034

-0.031

-0.034

-0.026

0.300

0.287

0.311

0.299

0.323

0.308

0.250

0.237

0.288

0.292

0.733

0.620

1.259

1.191

0.752

0.653

0.647

0.526

0.594

0.530

0.016

0.015

0.013

0.013

0.017

0.017

0.016

0.017

0.015

0.013

0.227

0.200

0.167

0.200

0.232

0.200

0.268

0.200

0.194

0.200

1711

115

902

345

349

Figure 7: Inflation and Growth Performance across Exchange Rate
Regimes

0.250
0.200

Hard Pegs
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Floats

0.150
0.100
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Table 4 :Descriptive Statistics across Income and Exchange Rate Regimes

Money Growth
Inflation
Output Growth
Money Growth
Inflation
Output Growth
Money Growth
Inflation
Output Growth
Money Growth
Inflation
Output Growth
Money Growth
Inflation
Output Growth

Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard Floats
Money growth
Money growth (-1)
Money growth (-2)
Real GDP growth
Openness
Turnover rate
Terms of trade growth
Budget balance
Year
Adj R-squared
Number observations

All Regimes

Hard Pegs

Soft Pegs

Hard Floats

Floats

0.156
0.112
0.017

All Observations
0.104
0.047
0.030

0.132
0.094
0.014

0.235
0.176
0.026

0.162
0.121
0.014

Upper and Upper-Middle Income Observations
0.137
0.116
0.116
0.092
0.045
0.074
0.021
0.033
0.020

0.251
0.200
0.029

0.104
0.068
0.019

Lower and Lower Middle Income Observations
0.176
0.084
0.149
0.133
0.051
0.114
0.013
0.025
0.008

0.222
0.158
0.028

0.225
0.180
0.008

High Inflation Observations (>10%)
0.228
0.168
0.182
0.209
0.157
0.177
0.009
0.050
0.004

0.290
0.251
0.018

0.256
0.232
0.004

Low Inflation Observations (<10%)
0.105
0.096
0.102
0.043
0.033
0.043
0.023
0.028
0.020

0.145
0.054
0.037

0.092
0.039
0.021

Table 5 : Inflation Regression Results
De jure
De facto
Coefficient
t-stat
Coefficient
1.674
3.301
2.106
-0.035
-4.112
-0.044
-0.008
-1.538
-0.023
0.028
3.910
0.015
0.221
10.460
0.233
0.005
2.630
0.004
0.001
0.886
0.001
-0.412
-6.539
-0.398
-0.016
-4.210
-0.011
0.041
4.108
0.052
-0.070
-2.687
-0.080
-0.164
-3.887
-0.154
0.001
3.181
0.001
0.660
1401

t-stat
3.640
-5.834
-4.872
1.649
8.484
1.859
0.709
-5.946
-2.637
4.562
-2.648
-3.363
3.538

0.652
1101
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Table 6 : Inflation Regression Results Across Samples
De jure
De facto
De jure
De facto
Coefficient
t-stat
Coefficient
t-stat
Coefficient
t-stat
Coefficient
t-stat
High income observations
Low inflation observations ()
5.426
6.970
5.360
6.162
1.831
4.434
2.139
4.811
0.070
4.804
0.050
3.787
-0.013
-1.306
-0.017
-1.927
0.008
1.725
0.001
0.099
-0.001
-0.186
-0.007
-2.291
0.050
2.846
0.014
1.208
0.008
1.867
0.000
0.009
509
0.764
336
0.794
885
0.285
710
0.267
Upper-middle income observations
Open economy observations
4.111
2.177
4.487
2.514
5.001
5.312
4.231
4.518
-0.129
-4.419
-0.110
-6.816
-0.042
-1.777
-0.030
-1.712
-0.046
-1.594
-0.044
-3.419
-0.046
-3.104
-0.036
-4.621
0.023
0.720
0.058
2.189
0.008
0.437
0.007
0.507
269
0.851
238
0.860
416
0.678
356
0.680
Low and low-middle income
Current account restrictions
observations
observations
-1.068
-1.040
0.675
0.631
1.003
0.635
0.843
0.588
-0.073
-5.993
-0.083
-8.201
-0.103
-5.621
-0.100
-8.082
-0.012
-1.129
-0.032
-3.900
-0.034
-2.249
-0.039
-4.594
-0.014
-1.418
-0.011
-0.932
-0.017
-1.064
0.001
0.056
623
0.610
497
0.616
586
0.663
469
0.681
High inflation observations (>10%)
Capital account restriction observations
-2.131
-2.776
-1.720
-2.563
1.256
1.148
1.527
1.466
-0.017
-0.829
-0.020
-0.927
-0.081
-5.634
-0.078
-6.347
-0.006
-0.524
-0.021
-2.530
-0.033
-3.232
-0.035
-5.291
0.008
0.630
0.025
1.379
-0.005
-0.422
0.008
0.547
516
0.690
391
0.702
939
0.674
336
0.794

Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard Floats
Number observations, R2
Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard floats
Number observations, R2

Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard floats
Number observations, R2
Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard floats
Number observations, R2

Table 7 : Simultaneous Equation Model (Hard Pegs versus All Regimes)
First Stage Probit Estimation on Hard Pegs

Second Stage Inflation Regression

OLS Estimates

Coefficient

z-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Constant

-10.080

-0.529

Constant

Inflation (-1)

-4.083

-3.014

Hard Pegs

1.18

2.472

1.674

3.301

-0.026

-3.11

-0.035

-4.112

inflation (-2)

1.341

1.0404

Money growth

0.198

8.964

0.221

10.46

Money growth

0.075

0.1987

Money growth (-1)

0.006

2.448

0.005

2.063

Money growth (-1)

0.026

1.6044

Money growth (-2)

0.002

1.041

0.001

0.886

Money growth (-2)

0.038

2.1378

Output growth

-0.39

-5.995

-0.412

-6.539

Output growth

1.552

0.7055

Trade openness

-0.01

-2.204

-0.016

-4.21

Trade openness

0.345

2.298

Turnover rate

0.037

3.646

0.041

4.108

Turnover rate

-0.570

-1.632

Terms of trade

-0.057

-2.279

-0.07

-2.687

Terms of trade

0.075

0.1393

Budget balance

-0.162

-3.966

-0.164

-3.887

Budget balance

-3.031

-2.613

Year

0.001

2.37

0.001

3.181

Population

-0.004

-0.431

Adj. R-squared

0.656

0.66

Year

-0.014

-2.837

Observations

1399

1401

R-Squared

0.191

Observations

1399
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Table 8 : Growth Regression Results
De jure

De facto

Coefficient

t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Constant
Hard pegs
Soft pegs
Hard floats
Educational attainment

0.308
0.001
-0.001
0.007
0.001

0.961
0.125
-0.237
2.289
2.147

0.828
0.001
0.002
0.008
0.001

2.573
0.086
0.845
2.414
1.456

Inflation
Investment
Taxation
Budget balance
Terms of trade

-0.043
0.100
-0.017
0.068
0.017

-3.727
4.896
-1.459
2.453
1.169

-0.054
0.077
-0.014
0.094
0.009

-4.459
3.498
-1.229
3.468
0.565

Openness

0.008

2.682

0.006

1.801

Population growth

-0.802

-8.314

-0.773

-7.795

Population (log)

0.003

3.682

0.002

2.939

Initial income

-0.029

-5.464

-0.025

-4.994

Year

0.000

0.921

0.000

2.523

Adj R-squared

0.206

0.209

Number observations

1237

1125

Table 9 : Growth Regression Results across Samples
De jure
Coefficient

De facto
t-stat

Coefficient

De jure
t-stat

Coefficient

High income observations

De facto
t-stat

Coefficient

t-stat

Low inflation observations

Constant

0.808

2.423

0.776

2.130

0.992

3.251

1.155

2.990

Hard pegs

-0.036

-2.649

-0.038

-2.541

-0.009

-1.367

-0.009

-1.448

Soft pegs

0.000

-0.073

0.004

1.245

-0.001

-0.395

-0.002

-0.746

Hard Floats

-0.001

-0.300

0.006

1.521

0.003

0.842

0.004

1.317

381

0.278

374

0.318

907

0.235

732

0.216

Number observations, R2

Upper-middle income observations

Open economy observations

Constant

0.566

0.666

-0.027

-0.031

1.464

2.065

1.521

1.927

Hard pegs

0.007

0.520

0.024

2.199

0.001

0.165

0.001

0.152

Soft pegs

-0.008

-0.772

0.007

0.820

0.004

0.666

0.004

0.835

Hard floats

0.001

0.076

0.011

1.288

0.008

1.213

0.013

2.017

274

0.214

243

0.241

421

0.271

361

0.286

Number observations, R2

Low and low-middle income observations

Current account restrictions observations

Constant

1.425

3.263

1.331

2.651

1.783

3.729

1.436

2.641

Hard pegs

0.000

-0.027

0.007

0.550

0.036

2.263

0.042

3.120

Soft pegs

-0.005

-1.044

-0.001

-0.289

0.002

0.321

0.007

1.442

Hard floats

-0.002

-0.521

0.000

0.060

0.007

1.288

0.012

2.130

0.256

508

0.197

598

0.278

478

0.248

Number observations, R2

643

High inflation observations

Capital account restriction observations

Constant

1.297

2.244

0.614

0.987

0.891

2.558

0.802

1.974

Hard pegs

0.048

2.523

0.054

2.752

0.028

1.645

0.034

2.254

Soft pegs

-0.006

-1.042

0.008

1.542

0.000

-0.024

0.003

0.940

Hard floats

0.004

0.768

0.009

1.709

0.006

1.367

0.009

2.455

518

0.172

393

0.148

953

0.229

756

0.199

Number observations, R2
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Table 10: Measures of Volatility - Standard Deviation of Inflation and Growth (in percentage points)
Hard Pegs
Soft pegs
Hard Floats
Floats
De
De
De
De jure/De facto De jure
facto
De jure
facto
De jure
facto
Median
4.59%
7.21%
6.99% 13.73% 10.55% 9.75% 19.10%
Inflation
Std. Dev.
10.91%
11.83% 8.73% 17.85% 17.40% 21.49% 27.43%
Observations
244
2615
1851
646
265
603
251
Median
3.17%
1.60%
1.56%
2.31%
2.42%
1.68%
0.52%
Growth
Std. Dev.
5.92%
8.45%
7.53%
4.60%
3.66%
8.13% 10.32%
Observations
244
2615
1851
646
265
603
251

Figure 8: Exchange Rate Regime Volatility De Facto Classification - Standard Deviation of
Inflation, Money Growth and Output Growth (in percentage terms)

25.00%
20.00%
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15.00%

Soft pegs
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Hard Floats
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0.00%
Inflation

Hard Pegs
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Growth
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Figure 9: Exchange Rate Regime Volatility De Facto Classification - Standard Deviation of
Inflation, Money Growth and Output Growth (in percentage terms)
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Table 11: Measures of Instability, De Jure Classification
Banking Crises
7
Occurrences

Banking Crises
8
Observations

Currency Crises
Occurrences

Currency Crises
Observations

Severe
9
Recessions

All Regimes

3.22%

13.70%

4.54%

6.58%

3.91%

Hard Pegs

2.00%

8.40%

0.40%

0.80%

2.46%

Soft Pegs

2.07%

9.16%

3.65%

4.97%

3.17%

Hard Floats

4.42%

18.90%

6.71%

10.06%

1.55%

Floats

7.04%

31.10%

8.02%

12.60%

7.13%

Observations

4313

4313

4313

4313

4727

(Each entry represents the percent value of all observations of the
specific exchange rate regime which are defined as crisis (or start of crisis) episodes.)

Figure 10: Measures of Instabiliy, De Jure Classification
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%

Hard Pegs
Soft Pegs

10.00%

Hard Floats
Floats

5.00%
0.00%
Banking
Banking
Crises
Crises
Occurences Observations

Currency
Currency
Crises
Crises
Occurences Observations

Severe
Recessions

7

Takes into account only the start year of a crisis
Takes into account all years of a crisis episode
9
Defined as observations registering an output per capita growth rate of -10%
8
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Table 12: Measures of Instability, De Jure Classification
Banking Crises
Occurrences

Banking Crises
Observations

Currency Crises
Occurrences

Currency Crises
Observations

Severe
Recessions

All Regimes

3.22%

Hard Pegs

Floats

2.00%
1.78%
2.59%
9.84%

13.70%
8.40%
8.39%
12.96%
43.70%

4.54%
0.40%
1.18%
5.19%
13.39%

6.58%
0.80%
1.33%
8.52%
21.26%

3.91%
2.40%
2.91%
1.11%
15.35%

Observations

4313

4313

4313

4313

4727

Soft Pegs
Hard Floats

(Each entry represents the percent value of all observations of the
specific exchange rate regime which are defined as crisis (or start of crisis) episodes.)

Figure 11: Measures of Instabiliy, De Facto Classification
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